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FROM ACES TO FETAL TRAUMA: HOW SLIPPERY IS THE SLOPE
OF DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING FACTORS?
Avi Muller*
I. INTRODUCTION
We often ignore sentencings. Television shows and movies with
trials end with either an acquittal or a finding of guilt. In the latter
instance, the viewer seldom glimpses what comes after—the
sentencing. For defendants, however, this is one of the most important
days in their lives. For judges, it is one of the most essential functions
they serve, and the processes by which it plays out are crucial. After all,
a sentencing often results in the removal of a defendant’s liberty.
Scholars and judges argue whether sentencing should be a strict
process governed by bright-line rules or a more fluid, human process in
the hands of each judge.1 Within the latter system, a major sub-issue is
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what judges should and should not consider in imposing a sentence.
Some factors do not even pose a question; for example, we would not
want judges to consider a defendant’s clothing in determining whether
and how long to imprison a defendant. But it is generally accepted that
a judge should be able to consider a defendant’s remorse and acceptance
of responsibility.2 This conversation implicates questions related to the
goals of sentencing—rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution3—as well as philosophical questions of free will, culpability,
and determinism.
These questions become even more complicated with the
introduction of science. Science and law have a complicated
relationship. Lawyers often try to introduce scientific research into the
legal process with mixed results.4 But “scientists do not assert that they
know what is immutably ‘true’—they are committed to searching for
new, temporary, theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena.”5
Much of this scientific evidence comes in as part of the criminal
adjudication process. Although much of it is used during trial—e.g., DNA
evidence to prove identity; diagnoses to support an insanity defense—it
has also been used to support an increase or decrease in a defendant’s
sentence—e.g., mental illness to preclude the imposition of the death
sentence.6
Accepting the current system as it is—a system with advisory rules
that leaves some discretion with the judge7—this Comment examines
how judges use scientific evidence at sentencing and argues whether
and to what extent judges should consider a defendant’s experience of
fetal trauma.8 While sentencing schemes differ from state to state, this
Comment will focus on the federal sentencing system. Part II of this
Comment will discuss the history of sentencing in the United States and
examine the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) and how
they work today. Part III details the role of behavioral science research
Apprendi, Blakely and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163 (2005); Myron H. Thompson, Opinion,
Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/
01/21/opinion/sentencing-and-sensibility.html.
2 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3E1.1, 5K2.16 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N
2018) [hereinafter USSG].
3 FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 3 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2018) [hereinafter THE
BASICS].
4 See infra Part III.
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (quoting Brief for
Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9).
6 See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
7 See infra Section II.B.
8 That is, trauma experienced by the defendant’s mother while the defendant is in
utero.
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in the legal system in general and at sentencing. Specifically, it will
analyze the research on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) and
criminal behavior and examine how judges use ACEs at sentencing. Part
IV discusses the current research on fetal trauma and how, if at all, it
connects fetal traumatic experience to criminal behavior. Finally, Part
V applies the research on fetal trauma to the current sentencing scheme
and compares this to the research and use of ACEs to argue whether
judges should be considering fetal trauma to the same extent or even at
all. In sum, this Comment will argue that judges, although perhaps
justified in their exercise of discretion at sentencing, should stop short
of considering a defendant’s traumatic experience while in utero.
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER AND DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING
The United States has a long and complicated history with
sentencing. Over the last two and a half centuries, we have bounced
around from nearly unlimited discretion in sentencing to a system that
restricted judges’ ability to consider certain factors to a system that is
now somewhere in between.9 This Part begins with a brief history of
sentencing in the United States and its evolution into the system we use
today. It then discusses the Guidelines, how judges use them, and the
impact they have on sentences. Although this Part will recognize the
various arguments and principles behind both the more discretionary
and more limited systems, the answer to which is superior is beyond the
scope of this Comment. This Comment accepts the current scheme and
applies its principles to evidence of fetal trauma.
A. A Brief History of Sentencing
Even those outside the legal world recognize the phrase “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” This is the burden of proof the prosecutor bears in
a criminal case.10 Any evidence that a prosecutor puts forth to satisfy
this burden, and establish a defendant’s guilt, is strictly regulated by the
rules of evidence “to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just
determination.”11 For example, hearsay12 is not admissible at trial
unless it falls into an exception provided by the rules or other federal
9

See infra Section II.A.
MARC L. MILLER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURES PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION: CASES,
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 467 (Wolters Kluwer Legal, 6th ed. 2019).
11 FED. R. EVID. 102.
12 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement “offer[ed] in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c). To illustrate, when proving
the color of a traffic light at the time of an accident, it would be inadmissible hearsay for
a witness to testify that “my friend saw the accident and told me ‘the light was green for
Driver A.’”
10
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statutes.13 The Constitution also governs the admissibility of evidence
at trial. For example, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides a defendant with a right to confront any witness brought to
testify against him.14 This ensures a fair adversarial process and
protects defendants from unreliable testimony by allowing them to
challenge any testimony offered against them.15 These protections,
however, apply to evidence admitted at trial to prove a defendant’s
guilt.16
In contrast, sentencing judges historically exercised “wide
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used . . . in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed.”17 Sentencing judges
even used hearsay, which is presumptively not allowed to prove a
defendant’s guilt,18 in determining an appropriate sentence.19 During
this time, limitations on sentencing consisted of federal statutes setting
a maximum fine or term of years and “permitting the sentencing judge
to impose any term of imprisonment and any fine up to the statutory
maximums.”20 The two primary guiding principles of this indeterminate
sentencing system were rehabilitation21 and individualism.22
As with many well-intentioned practices, this system had
unintended consequences.23 Bipartisan criticism of indeterminate
sentencing peaked in the 1960s and 1970s due to increased crime rates,
high recidivism, and sentencing disparities by class and race.24 After
concluding that rehabilitation should be de-emphasized and that
individualized sentences led to unwarranted sentencing disparities,
reformers proceeded in two directions: they passed laws with
mandatory penalty schemes (such as mandatory minimums for
13

FED. R. EVID. 802.
U.S. CONST amend. VI.
15 See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
16 While there are Constitutional limitations on information offered at sentencing in
a few special situations, the bulk of regulation is on evidence at trial. See infra Section
II.A.
17 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (noting this system was in place
“since the American colonies became a nation”).
18 See FED. R. EVID. 802.
19 Williams, 337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that much of what the
sentencing judge used to decide the proper sentence would have been inadmissible at
trial as hearsay).
20 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993).
21 Id. at 240; see also Bowman, supra note 1, at 370.
22 Bowman, supra note 1, at 370; see also Williams 337 U.S. at 247 (“[T]he
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.”).
23 Yellen, supra note 1, at 165.
24 Yellen, supra note 1, at 165–66.
14
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narcotics and weapons offenses) and established the Guidelines through
the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act.25 This complex set of federal
sentencing guidelines “severely restrict[ed] the ability of judges to
consider individual offender characteristics.”26 Despite these restrictive
guidelines, Supreme Court jurisprudence was still hands-off with
regards to procedural and substantive fairness in sentencing.27 Until
2000, any facts introduced at sentencing “did not need to be determined
by more than a preponderance of the evidence.”28
Beginning in 2000, with Apprendi v. New Jersey,29 the Court began
to impose greater limits on fact-finding at sentencing.30 In Apprendi, the
Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”31 Two years later, the Court held
that if a state statute provides for an increase in punishment that is
contingent on a finding of fact, “that fact—no matter how the State labels
it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”32 This played
out in 2004 when the Court hinted at the future advisory nature of the
Guidelines with its decisions in Blakely v. Washington.33 The sentencing
judge, applying the procedures in Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act,
imposed a punishment that exceeded the statutory range after finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with
“deliberate cruelty.”34 Although “deliberate cruelty” was not a factor
listed in the statute,35 state law authorized an increase above the

25

Yellen, supra note 1, at 166–67.
Yellen, supra note 1, at 168.
27 Id. (noting that the Court was “both highly deferential to legislative choices and
very tolerant of procedural informality”); see also Williams 337 U.S. at 245 (holding that
a “sentencing judge may consider such information even though obtained outside the
courtroom from persons whom a defendant has not been permitted to confront or crossexamine”).
28 Yellen, supra note 1, at 168.
29 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
30 These limits were alluded to in Justice Murphy’s dissent in Williams. Williams,
337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J. dissenting) (“[A judge] should be willing to increase” a jury
prescribed penalty of life to a penalty of death “only with the most scrupulous regard
for the rights of the defendant.”).
31 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (invalidating a New Jersey statute that allowed judges
to increase an already established statutory maximum penalty if the judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence a motivation of racial animus).
32 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 586 (2002).
33 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
34 Id. at 299–301.
35 Conversely, the factors in Apprendi (racial animus as part of a “hate crime” law)
and Ring (“aggravating factors” set forth by Arizona law) were explicitly required by
state law. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69; Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
26
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statutory maximum after a finding of a “substantial and compelling
reason.”36 The Court, however, held that the state’s sentencing
procedure violated the Sixth Amendment and invalidated the
defendant’s sentence.37
This seemed to contradict the Guidelines—which allowed for
similar upward departures—and ultimately set the stage for the Court’s
inevitable decision to nullify their mandatory nature.38 Like the
Washington guidelines, the federal guidelines mandated increases to
sentencing ranges based on facts that did not need to be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.39 Soon after Blakely, these mandates led to the
Court’s holding in Booker that the Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment.40 In fashioning a remedy, the Court struck the provisions
of the Guidelines that made them mandatory, making them effectively
advisory.41 As a result, sentencing courts were required to “consider
guidelines ranges” but permitted to “tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns.”42 The Court also ruled that the standard of review
for sentencing appeals would be a “review for unreasonableness.”43
This standard affords a high level of deference to the sentencing judge,
including the judge’s consideration of various factors in determining the
appropriate sentence.44
B. The Guidelines and How They Work Today
The Guidelines are long and complicated.45 This Comment focuses
on a judge’s discretion to sentence a defendant within the Guidelines
range, depart from that range, or vary from that range. To understand
these concepts, it is first important to understand how defendants are
sentenced under the Guidelines. Since Booker, the Court has adopted a
three-step process for sentencing: the judge should (1) properly
determine the Guidelines range, (2) determine whether to depart based
on the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, and (3) determine

36

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
Id. at 305.
38 Yellen, supra note 1, at 172.
39 Id.
40 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005).
41 Id. at 246.
42 Id. at 245.
43 Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
44 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (explaining that the Booker
“reasonableness” standard “asks whether the trial court abused its discretion”).
45 The Guidelines Manual is over 600 pages consisting of eight chapters with over
100 parts and sub-parts. See generally USSG, supra note 2.
37
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whether to vary based on statutory factors.46 Although Booker still
requires sentencing courts to consider the Guidelines,47 subsequent
case law instructs courts to make a decision based on an individualized
assessment and not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.48
Furthermore, while Supreme Court precedent requires evidence that
increases a statutory minimum or maximum to be found beyond a
reasonable doubt,49 other factual findings—specifically those that go
toward a sentence within the Guidelines range or a downward
departure or variance—still carry the preponderance of the evidence
standard.50
1. Determining the Guidelines Range
First, the sentencing judge consults Appendix A of the Guidelines
Manual to determine which offense guideline to apply.51 This Appendix
is an index of each federal criminal statute matched to their applicable
offense guideline.52 This yields a base offense level.53 For example, a
judge sentencing a defendant guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm will check Appendix A for 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(3),54 see it matches with offense guideline 2A2.2,55 and consult
the Guidelines to determine that the base offense level is 14.56 The judge
then consults any specific characteristics under the offense guideline
and chapter three of the Guidelines Manual to determine whether there
are additional adjustments to be made on the base offense level.57
Continuing the example, if the defendant used and discharged a
firearm,58 the assault was motivated by money or something of value,59
and the defendant clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility,60
the offense level would be 19.

46 PRIMER DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 2–3 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2019) [hereinafter
PRIMER]; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007).
47 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
48 Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
49 See supra Section II.A.
50 See United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011).
51 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 13.
52 See USSG, supra note 2, app. A.
53 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 13.
54 The federal assault statute. 18 U.S.C. § 113.
55 USSG, supra note 2, app. A.
56 Id. § 2A2.2.
57 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 14.
58 Increase by five levels. USSG, supra note 2, § 2A2.2(b)(2).
59 Increase by two levels. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(5).
60 Decrease by two levels. Id. § 3E1.1(a).
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Our hypothetical defendant served less than 60 days for a prior
crime61 and committed the instant assault while on probation,62 thus
giving the defendant four criminal history points. This places the
defendant in Zone D of the sentencing table with a Guidelines range of
37–46 months imprisonment.63 Accordingly, the judge has nearly
limitless discretion to consider almost any information in deciding to
sentence the defendant to a specific term of imprisonment anywhere
within that range.64 The judge, however, may also consider any grounds
for a departure or variance from the applicable Guidelines range.65
While the two technically differ, they both operate to allow the judge to
impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range.66
2. Departures and Variances
“‘Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to
non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the
Guidelines.”67 The Guidelines define departure as the “imposition of a
sentence outside the applicable guideline range or of a sentence that is
otherwise different from the guideline sentence.”68 Put another way,
“[a] ‘departure’ is typically a change from the final sentencing range
computed by examining the provisions of the guidelines themselves.”69
Departures are commonly requested by the prosecutor to reward
cooperation or triggered “by other factors that take the case ‘outside the
heartland’ contemplated by the Sentencing Commission when it drafted
the guidelines for a typical offense.”70 As such, departures are meant to
be rare and apply to exceptional cases.71 In sum, there are several
defining characteristics of departures: (1) they are statutorily
authorized;72 (2) they require an aggravating or mitigating
61

Two points toward Criminal History Category. USSG, supra note 2, § 4A1.1(b).
Two more points toward Criminal History Category. Id. § 4A1.1(d).
63 Id. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table.
64 Id. § 1B1.4.
65 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 14.
66 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 18.
67 Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008).
68 USSG, supra note 2, § 1B1.1, cmt. (n.1(F)).
69 United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Cruz-Perez, 567 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009)), cert. denied,
568 U.S. 1182 (2013).
70 Id. (emphasis added).
71 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 5.
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence . . . within the
range . . . unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
. . . .”).
62
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circumstance not considered by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the Guidelines;73 and (3) the departing judge must still
consult the “sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.”74
Variances, on the other hand, are not subject to the Guidelines
analysis in the way departures are.75 While the Guidelines expressly
prohibit consideration of various factors in granting a departure,76 these
same factors are fair game to a judge granting a variance.77 This
difference will sometimes result in a court granting both a departure
and a variance.78 A judge grants a variance when she “imposes a
sentence above or below the otherwise properly calculated final
sentencing range based on application of the other statutory factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”79 The many factors listed include “the history and
characteristics of the defendant.”80
While sentencing judges must state the reasons for a particular
sentence in open court, judges varying or departing from the Guidelines
range must also specifically state the reasons in a “statement of reasons”
form.81 Whether these reasons result in a sentence within the
Guidelines range or in a departure or variance, they generally take the
form of various mitigating or aggravating circumstances presented in
the presentence report or at the sentencing hearing.82 This may include
a slew of factors unrelated to the instant offense: defendant’s abusive
upbringing; functional illiteracy; learning disability; absence of positive
male role models; addiction; efforts to be a functioning member of
society; stated desire to rehabilitate; remorse;83 significantly reduced
mental capacity; aberrant behavior; anticipated trauma to a defendant’s
infant if separated from her;84 vulnerability in prison; and HIV positive

73

Id.
Id.
75 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 317 (3d Cir. 2011).
76 See, e.g., USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.10 (policy statement providing that race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status are not relevant factors).
77 United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 830–31 (8th Cir. 2009).
78 See PRIMER, supra note 46, at 39 (giving the example of departing for substantial
assistance under 5K1.1 and varying for defendant characteristics and history (ones not
generally allowed by the Guidelines for purposes of a departure) under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)).
79 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 5.
80 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
82 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 6–7.
83 United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
84 United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338–39 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
74
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status.85 Ironically, although the Guidelines attempt to restrict a
sentencing judge’s ability to consider certain factors,86 it also concedes
that “it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that
encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a
sentencing decision.”87
Although sentencing judges have more discretion now that the
Guidelines are advisory and the system provides for departures and
variances, mandatory minimums are still an issue.88 Mandatory
minimums restrict judges and place a lot of sentencing power in the
hands of the legislature and prosecutors.89 That said, in 2018, only
24.7% of federal offenders were convicted of offenses carrying
mandatory minimum penalties.90 And there are ways to avoid
mandatory minimums; 40.6% of these offenders were relieved of the
mandatory minimum due to “substantial assistance” or through the
“safety valve provision.”91 A defendant who has substantially assisted
the government in the investigation or prosecution of another person
may receive, upon motion of the prosecution, a sentence below a
mandatory minimum.92
Defendants convicted of certain drugtrafficking offenses may qualify for a departure from the mandatory
minimum through the statutory “safety valve.”93 In these drugtrafficking cases—usually low-level, non-violent offenses94—the
sentencing judge considers five statutory criteria to determine whether
to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum.95 While
mandatory minimums and their effect on the discretion of sentencing
judges are an important part of the sentencing conversation, they are
beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment recognizes that they
exist and sometimes limit judges’ sentencing capability. But the present
focus is on the many instances in which mandatory minimums do not
85

United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
See, e.g., USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.12 (stating that “lack of guidance as a youth” is
not grounds for departure).
87 USSG, supra note 2, Ch. 1, Pt. A, introduction, 4(b).
88 See Hofer, supra note 1, at 137.
89 Hofer, supra note 1, at 140–41; see also USSG, supra note 2, § 5G1.1 (noting that,
when statutory minimums or maximums conflict with the Guidelines range, the
Guidelines defer to the statute).
90 QUICK FACTS MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 1 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2018).
91 Id. at 1.
92 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
93 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 9; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
94 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 9.
95 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (these criteria include the defendant’s criminal history,
absence of violence, death, or injury, role in the offense, and cooperation and
truthfulness); see also USSG, supra note 2, § 5C1.2.
86
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apply, and judges have wide latitude to consider facts that lead to more
individualized sentences.
3. Sentencing Post-Booker
Although the Guidelines were an attempt to control the sentencing
process,96 statistics show that, since Booker, judges have gotten more
comfortable with imposing sentences below the Guidelines range.97
Sentences within range have fallen since Booker, and most of the
departures and variances have been downward. In 2006, the year after
Booker was decided, judges imposed 61.7% of sentences within the
Guidelines range, 1.6% above the range, and a total of 36.6% below the
range.98 Of those sentences below the Guidelines range, 24.6% were
government sponsored,99 and 12% were non-government sponsored.100
In 2018, 51% of sentences were within the Guidelines range, 2.6%
above the range, and a total of 46.5% below the range.101 Of those
sentences below the Guidelines range, 26.5% were government
sponsored, and 20% were non-government sponsored.102 These
statistics show a 10% decrease in sentences imposed within the
Guidelines range since Booker, and nearly all of the difference has been
made up by an increase in downward departures and variances. For
whatever reason, judges seem happy to regain some of their sentencing
discretion.
The question is why. Judges do have philosophical differences,103
and those who disagreed with the Guidelines may have been looking for
a way out, even before the Court heard Booker. After all, judges are
human, not immune to cognitive dissonance, and perhaps felt that some
individuals, and maybe even some offenses, did not deserve the level of
punishment doled out by the Guidelines.104 Perhaps this increase in
96

Hofer, supra note 1, at 159.
See, generally, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (U.S.
SENTENCING CMM’N 2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (U.S.
SENTENCING CMM’N 2018).
98 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 1 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N
2006).
99 One example of this is when the government moves for a departure due to the
defendant’s § 5K1.1 substantial assistance. See id. (14.4% in 2006).
100 Id. (4.7% of which were departures and 7.3% of which were variances).
101 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 11 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N
2018).
102 Id. (2.5% were departures and 17.4% variances).
103 Hofer, supra note 1, at 160.
104 See Barkow, supra note 1, at 1148 (suggesting that the Court’s interest in its
“bipolar approach to substantive sentencing law” allows it to “feel better about its role”
in administering punishment).
97
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departures and variances is a modest sigh of relief that the Court took a
firm, positive stance on judicial discretion in the sentencing process.105
Even more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has upheld the
principle that “possession of the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant’s life and characteristics” is essential to the sentencing
process.106
There is a dense forest of legal and philosophical scholarship on the
issue of whether and how much discretion should be in the hands of
sentencing judges.107 On the one hand, individual cases are nuanced and
require “a certain fluidity in imposing punishment,” best exercised by
the trial judge who better understands the “full complexity of the
offender and . . . appreciate[s] the subtleties in determining the
punishment that justice demands.”108 Furthermore, it would be unjust
to impose the same punishment for people with different backgrounds,
just as it would be unjust to impose different punishments for those
convicted of similar crimes with similar backgrounds and
circumstances.109 On the other hand, wide discretion may lead to
sentencing discrepancies for people who have committed the same
crime.110 Additionally, judges exercising wide discretion sometimes act
more like medical examiners or conduct a unique form of moral
reasoning—a role judges are not familiar with and a setting where due
process may not exist.111 Whether discretionary sentencing should exist
and whether it should fall on the judge are beyond the scope of this
Comment. This Comment accepts the existence of Booker and the
current federal sentencing scheme and analyzes how this scheme
should (if at all) apply to fetal trauma evidence at sentencing.
105 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted
the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by
these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the SRA the
provisions that make the guidelines binding on district judges . . . .”).
106 Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (quoting Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246–47 (1949)). The Court also noted that Congress even codified this
principle. Id. (“Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that
‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider
‘concerning the [defendant’s] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a),
which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the
history and characteristics of the defendant.’”).
107 See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 1; Priester, supra note 1; Bowman, supra note 1;
Ramirez, supra note 1; Barkow, supra note 1; Yellen, supra note 1.
108 Thompson, supra note 1.
109 Id.
110 Bowman, supra note 1, at 371. This harkens back to the arguments made by the
reformers in justifying the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act. See supra Section II.A.
111 Bowman, supra note 1, at 373.
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III. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND CRIMINAL LAW
Whether and to what extent behavioral science research is allowed
in court—specifically at sentencing—raises several important
questions.112 How reliable is the scientific research? What purpose
should it serve? Should people predisposed to certain types of behavior
be punished for that behavior?113 If so, should predisposition serve as a
mitigating or aggravating factor?114 This Part seeks to explore these
questions and set the tone for whether, and to what extent, fetal trauma
evidence should be allowed at sentencing. It begins with a brief history
of behavioral sciences in the legal system and then discusses how
scientific findings should apply, if at all.
A. Behavioral Science in the Legal System and Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence
Although early application of behavioral sciences in law focused on
psychological research in criminal cases,115 it was not until Brown v.
Board of Education that psychological research, and as a result,
behavioral sciences in general, gained prominence in the legal system.116
A significant part of the growth of psychology in criminal law was in the
assessment of criminal defendants for criminological or mental health
purposes.117 Since then, behavioral sciences have played a role in
several areas in the law: evaluating mental illness to reduce
blameworthiness,118 determining the extent of physical brain injuries,119
and determining a defendant’s free will.120 The psychiatric profession
began to study battered-child syndrome in 1963 and suggested that
victims of violence in childhood would become future perpetrators of

112 Tufik Y. Shayeb, Behavioral Genetics & Criminal Culpability: Addressing the
Problem of Free Will in the Context of The Modern American Justice System, 19 U.D.C. L.
REV. 1, 53 (2016).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 James R. P. Ogloff et al., Education and Training in Psychology and Law/Criminal
Justice: Historical Foundations, Present Structures, and Future Developments, 23 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 200, 210 (1996).
116 Id. at 207–08; see also, Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S.
483, 494 n.11 (1954), supplemented sub nom. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
117 Ogloff et al., supra note 115, at 211.
118 Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, in THE IMPACT OF
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 125, 129 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 137.
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violence.121 It was not until Daubert, however, that the Court addressed
the admissibility of scientific evidence at trial.122
Before Daubert, scientific evidence was only allowed if it was
produced by techniques that have “general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.”123 The Court in Daubert ruled that federal
courts should look to the Federal Rules of Evidence and only allow
scientific evidence that is “reliable,” “relevant,” and “ground[ed] in the
methods and procedures of science.”124 The Court also noted that,
although the evidence must be more than “subjective belief or
unsupported speculation,”125 it does not have to be “‘known’ to a
certainty,” since “there are no certainties in science.”126 The Court then
stressed the importance of the validity of the scientific methodology
used to produce the scientific evidence being offered127 and noted its
confidence in federal judges to make this inquiry.128 In determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence at trial, a district judge is supposed
to make several appropriate observations:129 whether a theory or
technique can be or has been tested;130 whether the theory/technique
has been subject to peer review and publication;131 “the known or
potential rate of error;”132 and the scientific community’s “general
acceptance” of the research.133
It is important to note that this standard applies to the admissibility
of scientific evidence at trial,134 and such standards do not apply to a
judge’s considerations at sentencing.135 But scholars suggest that
121 George C. Curtis, Violence Breeds Violence—Perhaps?, 120 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 386,
386 (1963).
122 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).
123 Brett Walker, When the Facts and the Law are Against You, Argue the Genes?: A
Pragmatic Analysis of Genotyping Mitigation Defenses for Psychopathic Defendants in
Death Penalty Cases, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1779, 1807 (2013); Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
124 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90.
125 Id. at 590.
126 Id.
127 Id. 592–93.
128 Id. at 593.
129 Id.
130 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
131 Id. at 593–94 (although even “new” theories and techniques should not be
deemed per se inadmissible).
132 Id. at 594.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 589 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702) (referring to scientific knowledge in assisting
the “trier of fact . . . to determine a fact in issue”).
135 USSG, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt. (noting that, when sentencing judges consider
facts, they “are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial”).
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Daubert can be used as a framework for sentencing judges136 because
judges still need to give reasons for their sentences,137 the sentences
must withstand the reasonableness standard on appeal,138 and there
seems to be no working standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence at sentencing. Atkins v. Virginia139 is one of the most notable
cases where scientific evidence was used at sentencing, and the case
demonstrates the Court’s—and ultimately society’s—discomfort in
imposing sentences that may be too harsh for the specific offender.
B. Behavioral Science and Sentencing
Daryl Renard Atkins, the defendant, was convicted of capital
murder, among other crimes, and sentenced to death.140 At sentencing,
the prosecutor introduced two aggravating circumstances: future
dangerousness and “vileness of the offense.”141 Atkins introduced one
witness, Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic psychologist who, after evaluating
Atkins, testified that he was “mildly mentally retarded.”142 Dr. Nelson’s
evaluation consisted of interviews with people who knew Atkins, school
and court records, and an IQ test that showed Atkins had an IQ of 59.143
The Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that “death is not a
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”144 In its
reasoning, the Court noted the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”145 The Court determined that there
was a national consensus reflecting “widespread judgment about the
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship
between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the
death penalty.”146 According to the Court, imposing the death sentence
on “mentally retarded” defendants does not advance objectives such as

136 Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1859 (2003) (in the
context of using future dangerousness predictions in capital sentencings). For example,
the Second Circuit implicitly invoked Daubert in reversing an overly harsh sentence
after finding that the district court impermissibly relied “on its unsupported theory of
genetics” in its decision. United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2011).
137 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 6–7.
138 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
139 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
140 Id. at 307.
141 Id. at 307–08.
142 Id. at 308.
143 Id. at 308–09.
144 Id. at 321.
145 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
146 Id. at 317.
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retributivism and deterrence because they lack the requisite culpability
and ability to commit premeditated crimes.147
While Atkins addressed those diagnosed with “mental retardation,”
the Court hinted at the possibility of using other factors in mitigating
sentencing that relate to “the diminished ability to understand and
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, or to control impulses.”148 Also, while the Court addressed
these factors in the context of the death penalty149 this reasoning has
been used in subsequent cases to justify a shift in noncapital
sentences.150 The Court even went one step further and held in Roper v.
Simmons151 that since juveniles have a diminished sense of
responsibility, courts should not impose the death penalty on them;152
thus realizing the possibility discussed in Atkins that a full diagnosis of
“mental retardation” might not be necessary to avoid the death
penalty.153 Finally, the Court in Graham v. Florida154 extended these
principles to noncapital cases, holding that courts should not impose
sentences of life imprisonment without parole on juvenile offenders in
non-homicide cases.155
C. Is Behavioral Science Evidence Mitigating or Aggravating?
The application of behavioral science in sentencing decisions begs
the question whether such evidence should be a mitigating or
aggravating factor. At first glance, the question seems simple—we
should not hold those with genetic or biologic “deficiencies” to the same
penological standards as the “normal” culpable criminal.156 After all,
147

Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
149 Id. (noting that deterrence is not furthered if these impairments “make it less
likely that [defendants] can process the information of the possibility of execution as a
penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.”).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2011).
151 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
152 Id. at 569.
153 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320; see also Matthew L. Baum, The Monoamine Oxidase A
(MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials?, 6
NEUROETHICS 287, 287 (2013) (Italian judge used evidence of genetic variation linked to
aggression in reducing defendant’s sentence); Hill v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.
2003) (although death sentence eventually imposed, judge did allow, for mitigation
purposes, expert witness testimony at sentencing regarding defendant’s serotonin
deficiency that predisposed defendant to aggressive behavior).
154 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
155 Id. at 82.
156 Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability of Genetic
Information, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2121 (1994) (“Biological defenses have been used
to mitigate punishment on the assumption that genetic predisposition precludes free
148
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culpability—while more rigid when determining guilt—is a more
flexible concept and can have a greater impact at sentencing.157 For
example, in arguing that childhood trauma diminishes a defendant’s
culpability,158 one scholar contrasts affirmative defenses, such as duress
and necessity, to the use of evidence of childhood trauma at
sentencing.159 While duress and necessity require a strict showing that
a defendant’s actions were “influenced . . . by the exigencies of the
desperate situations in which [he] find[s] [him]sel[f],” sentencing
decisions do not require a similar “lack of choice.”160 Because of this less
strict standard at sentencing, Bagaric argues, evidence of external
factors such as childhood trauma removes enough choice from the
defendant such that it should be admitted and considered toward
mitigating a sentence.161
But not everyone agrees that lessened culpability should be the
main concern at sentencing if a concern at all.162 Some argue that
behavioral science, such as genetic information, could indicate a
proclivity for violence, be used to predict future dangerousness,163 and
thus justify a harsher sentence.164 For example, courts recognize the
possible aggravating nature of this evidence,165 and some have even
considered it as aggravating against certain defendants.166 In addition

will.”); Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the
Second Generation of Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858, 871 (2007)
(genetic tests could be used as a mitigating factor if judges agree that genetic makeup
could reduce free will).
157 Mirko Bagaric et al., Trauma and Sentencing: The Case for Mitigating Penalty for
Childhood Physical and Sexual Abuse, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39 (2019).
158 Id. at 34.
159 Id. at 40.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 40–41.
162 See, e.g., Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 156, at 871–72; Jones, supra note
118, at 138.
163 Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 156, at 871.
164 See, e.g., Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001), adopted sub
nom. Landrigan v. Schriro, 501 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Cossey, 632
F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011).
165 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (noting that reliance on mental
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a double-edged sword that may enhance the
likelihood that the jury will find the aggravating factor of future dangerousness).
166 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 907 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that
a childhood marred by sexual abuse contributed to distorted perception of rape and
child molestation thus making defendant a moderate to high risk to reoffend), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1300 (2019); Cossey, 632 F.3d at 86 (district court imposed a greater
sentence because it felt that defendant had a genetic predisposition to view child
pornography and thus a higher likelihood of re-offending); Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1229
(“although [defendant]’s new evidence can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it
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to future dangerousness, there is the possibility that such information
should be an aggravating factor for the sake of deterrence.167 If some
defendants are predisposed toward violent behavior but not completely
out of control, should we not be more inclined to impose a greater
deterrent effect on them?168 The same could be said for a greater need
to incapacitate or a lower likelihood of rehabilitation.
Genetic information can simultaneously cut in different directions:
mitigation, aggravation, no impact at all, or somewhere in between.169
This dilemma is yet another argument in support of higher discretion in
the hands of the sentencing judge, who can appreciate the nuance of
each case. That said, it is also an argument against allowing this
scientific research altogether. Whether such information should, as a
general rule, be allowed and act as a mitigating or aggravating factor is
beyond the scope of this Comment. But the human condition is complex,
and removing a person’s liberty is not a task we should take lightly. As
such, this Comment takes the position that, given the right
circumstances, this type of information (assuming it is supported by
reliable research, properly demonstrated, and appropriately
considered) can play an important role. That said, fetal trauma—as this
Comment argues170—does not satisfy this threshold for consideration.
When such information does meet this threshold, judges should
consider it as a mitigating factor for several reasons.
First, as the Supreme Court noted, our society is undergoing a
utilitarian progression, and a sign of a maturing society is tolerance and
understanding of one another, including criminal defendants.171
Second, while we should be concerned with the goal of protecting
society from those who might wish to harm it, or cannot help but doing
so, treating genetic predisposition as an aggravating factor is not the
best way to achieve that goal.
Behavioral genetics is often
misunderstood by non-scientists, inclining people to think crime is the
result of criminals having specific genes.172 The reality is quite the
opposite: “genes do not ‘determine’ behavior to any extent greater than
environments do.”173 The irony of this is that the same argument can be
applied to preventing genetic information altogether—after all, if genes
would also have shown the court that it could anticipate that he would continue to be
violent”).
167 Jones, supra note 118, at 139.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See infra Part V.
171 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
172 Jones, supra note 118, at 142.
173 Jones, supra note 118, at 143.
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do not determine behavior, why should we consider it as a mitigating
factor? But just because predispositions are not determinative of
behavior does not mean they do not require rehabilitation. And our
focus on rehabilitation must not accept the idea that certain types of
people are rehabilitation proof. Different people respond differently to
different forms of rehabilitation; there is no one-size-fits-all.174 Finally,
even the law provides that evidence such as genetic predispositions and
childhood trauma should be used as a mitigating factor.175 For example,
in determining whether the death sentence is justified, courts are
directed to consider—as a mitigating factor—a “defendant’s capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct . . . regardless of whether
the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge.”176
In addition to other specific mitigating factors, the court is then openendedly directed to consider “[o]ther factors in the defendant’s
background, record, or character.”177 Conversely, all the aggravating
factors listed in the statute relate to the defendant’s instant offense or
criminal history, and there is no provision directing the court to openendedly consider the defendant’s background or character for
aggravating purposes.178 This plays out in an excellent example of
information about a defendant that derives its credibility from
behavioral science and acts as a mitigating factor at
sentencing—Adverse Childhood Experiences.
D. Adverse Childhood Experiences
ACEs are potentially traumatic events, such as violence, abuse, or
neglect, that occur between infancy and 17 years of age.179 Of over
200,000 noninstitutionalized adults surveyed between 2011–2014,
almost two-thirds reported having at least one ACE, and more than one

174 Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Drug Courts and Other Problem-Solving Courts,
2 CHAP. J. CRIM. SCI. 57, 60 (2011) (“No intervention should be expected to work for all
individuals. In fact, it is a sign of an immature profession if one intervention is applied
to all clients.”).
175 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592.
176 Id. § 3592(a)(1).
177 Id. § 3592(a)(8).
178 See id. § 3592(a)–(d).
179 About Adverse Childhood Experiences, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(last updated Apr. 9, 2019) [hereinafter About ACEs], https://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/childabuseandneglect/acestudy/aboutace.html [https://web.archive.org/
web/20190912012107/https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseand
neglect/acestudy/aboutace.html].
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in four reported having three or more.180 This is striking since ACEs can
have a lasting impact on future behavior, health, and life
opportunities.181 Given these findings, it is no wonder that some
advocate using ACEs as a mitigating factor at sentencing.182 And judges
seem to agree: in a 2002 survey of district judges on the Guidelines, over
60% responded that they believe more emphasis should be placed on
mental conditions when determining sentences.183 This Section begins
with a brief introduction of ACEs research and then discusses several
cases where ACEs were used as a mitigating factor.
1. ACEs Research
While the nuances of ACEs research are important to address, a
crucial aspect of this research, with regards to sentencing, is that it is
generally recognized that ACEs highly correlate with various negative
outcomes in adulthood—especially risky behavior.184 This general
recognition is supported by numerous observational studies conducted
over the past half-century and has even been applied to criminal law
since 1963.185 The National Institute of Justice has sponsored and
published several studies in this area.186 The English study found that
children who were victims of violence were significantly more likely to
be arrested later in life.187 The Widom study found that youth victims of
abuse were 11 times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime as a
juvenile and almost three times more likely to be arrested for a violent

180

Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System ACE Data, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
(last updated Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
aces/ace-brfss.html.
181 About ACEs, supra note 179.
182 Bagaric et al., supra note 157, at 40–41.
183 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N’S SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES, app. B, B-8 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2002) (https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20021202_Judge_Survey.pdf).
184 See, e.g., About ACEs, supra note 179; ACEs and Toxic Stress: Frequently Asked
Questions, CENTER ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD HARV. UNIV. (last visited Nov. 2, 2019),
https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/aces-and-toxic-stress-frequentlyasked-questions; Adverse Childhood Experiences, NAT’L CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION MONTH
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/preventing/
preventionmonth/resources/ace.
185 See Curtis, supra note 121, at 386.
186 See, e.g., Cathy S. Widom & Michael G Maxfield, An Update on the “Cycle of Violence”,
in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1 (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2001); Diana J.
English et al., Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and Violent
Criminal Behavior: A Replication and Extension (NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE
SERVICE 2002).
187 Widom & Maxfield, supra note 186, at 1 (nearly 60% more likely to be arrested as
a juvenile and nearly 30% more likely as an adult).
AND PREVENTION
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crime as an adult.188 More recent studies have corroborated these
findings. For example, a 2012 study found that abused children are
more than twice as likely as their non-abused counterparts to have a
record of a violent offense.189 A 2018 systematic review of research into
the impact of childhood abuse on adult male prisoners found that
childhood abuse was “strongly associated with adult aggression,
impulsivity, and antisocial behavior.”190 The list goes on.191 Given the
strength and breadth of this research, it is no wonder judges are more
comfortable using ACEs as a mitigating factor at sentencing.192 First,
however, it is important to note that not only is the use of ACEs at
sentencing somewhat dissonant with the express policies and directives
of the Guidelines but the Guidelines seem to be at odds with themselves
in this regard.
2. ACEs and the Guidelines
Information regarding ACEs generally makes its way into
sentencing through the presentence report.193 A probation officer
creates a presentence report containing all the information a judge
might need to impose a proper sentence.194 If undisputed, the court
accepts all the information in the presentence report as a finding of
fact.195 On the one hand, the Guidelines state that “lack of guidance as a
youth” and similar disadvantaged upbringing are not grounds for a
departure.196 As to the definition of “lack of guidance as a youth,” a mere
different upbringing may not qualify as a departure factor,197 but
188

English et al., supra note 186, at 33–34.
James Topitzes et al., From Child Maltreatment to Violent Offending: An
Examination of Mixed-Gender and Gender-Specific Models, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
2322, 2334, 2338 (2012).
190 Teresa Goddard & Julie Ann Pooley, The Impact of Childhood Abuse on Adult Male
Prisoners: A Systematic Review, 34 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 215, 218 (2018).
191 See, e.g., Kathryn H. Howell et al., The Relationship Between Types of Childhood
Victimisation and Young Adulthood Criminality, 27 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 341,
342 (2017); Joshua P. Mersky & Arthur J. Reynolds, Child Maltreatment and Violent
Delinquency: Disentangling Main Effects and Subgroup Effects, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT
246, 246 (2007) (violent offenses committed at a significantly higher rate by those who
were victims of abuse in their youth compared to those who suffered none).
192 See infra Section III.D.2.
193 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (noting the report must contain “information that
assesses any financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any victim”).
194 USSG, supra note 2, § 6A1.1(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(B).
195 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A).
196 USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.12. That said, there are plenty of examples of cases in
which the judge, despite this explicit directive, considered “lack of guidance as a youth”
as a mitigating factor. See infra Section III.D.3.
197 See United Stated v. Godinez, 474 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2007) (losing father,
dropping out of school, and being illiterate until adolescence not enough for downward
189
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“extreme childhood abuse” would qualify.198 In the same chapter,
however, the Guidelines note that “mental and emotional conditions
may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if
[they] . . . distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the
guidelines.”199 Additional language allows departures based on
circumstances and characteristics not taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission; however, the Guidelines also note that this is
for extreme circumstances or where the characteristic is present “to an
exceptional degree.”200
An example of a departure under § 5K2.13 illustrates the lack of
clarity and unwillingness to give bright-line direction to judges in this
area. § 5K2.13 allows judges to consider “diminished capacity” toward
a downward departure.201 Specifically, the Guidelines require a
two-step process in considering diminished capacity: (1) whether “the
defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly
reduced mental capacity”; and (2) whether the reduced “capacity
contributed significantly to the commission of the offense.”202 A
significantly reduced mental capacity can be determined in one of two
instances: (1) an impaired ability to understand the wrongfulness of an
action or to exercise power of reason; or (2) an impaired ability to
control behavior the defendant knows is wrongful.203 Studies on the
effects ACEs have on brain development have demonstrated that adults
who have suffered ACEs develop increased aggression, impulsive anger,
and “impulsive decision-making during states of fear emotion.”204 The
rift between the application of “diminished capacity” and ACEs research
at sentencing is further widened since the Guidelines do not allow
“diminished capacity” to be a factor in specific cases: where drugs or
alcohol created the diminished capacity; where there is a great need to
protect the public, either because of the violence of the offense or
defendant’s criminal history; or where the defendant is being convicted
of an offense involving obscenity, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation,

departure); United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2003) (ignorance and lack of
education from Mennonite upbringing not enough for downward departure).
198 United States v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81, 84–85 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States
v. Walter, 256 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering extraordinary childhood abuse
as a sentencing factor).
199 USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.3.
200 USSG, supra note 2, § 5K2.0.
201 USSG, supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
202 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 25.
203 USSG, supra note 2, § 5K2.13 cmt. (n.1).
204 Michael D. De Bellis & Abigail Zisk, The Biological Effects of Childhood Trauma, 23
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 185, 205 (2014).
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abuse of children, or transportation for illegal sexual activity and related
crimes.205 Yet research indicates that those who have experienced ACEs
are more likely to commit violent offenses206—thus increasing their
likelihood of having criminal histories—and more likely to sexually
abuse others or commit other sex-related crimes as adults.207 Finally,
regardless of the Guidelines restrictions, sentencing statutes clearly
express no limitation on what a sentencing judge may consider.208
3. ACEs in Sentencing
These discrepancies are exaggerated by examples of cases in which
judges applied ACEs as a mitigating factor at sentencing, some in which
judges outright defied the express policies of the Guidelines. For
example, judges and scholars seem to agree that even the milder “lack
of guidance as a youth” can and should be a mitigating factor at
sentencing.209
In a case involving a more extreme example of ACEs, United States
v. Sawyer,210 the defendant used expert testimony to connect childhood
trauma to criminal behavior.211 Although the district court did not give
the testimony much consideration at sentencing, the Second Circuit held
that the district court “clearly failed to give appropriate weight to a
factor listed in Section 3553(a) that should have mitigated the sentence

205

PRIMER, supra note 46, at 25–26.
See supra Section III.D.1.
207 Cathy S. Widom & Christina Massey, Prospective Examination of Whether
Childhood Sexual Abuse Predicts Subsequent Sexual Offending, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1, 4
(2015).
208 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (generally describing that a sentencing judge shall
consider the “the history and characteristics of the defendant”); id. § 3661 (“No
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”).
209 See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 865 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting that
the district court took into consideration the defendant’s “lack of guidance as a youth”
as a mitigating factor despite it being outweighed by other aggravating factors); United
States v. Bettin, No. CR 17-083-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 3778461, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 12,
2019) (noting “lack of guidance as a youth” as a principal factor in a downward
departure); see also AMY BARON-EVANS & JENNIFER NILES COFFIN, NO MORE MATH WITHOUT
SUBTRACTION: DECONSTRUCTING THE GUIDELINES’ PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON MITIGATING
FACTORS 150 (2010), available at https://fln.fd.org/files/training/no-more-mathwithout-subtraction.pdf (“After Booker, there is no longer any need to show extreme
abuse or neglect to avoid the prohibitions of § 5H1.12, and courts have begun to
consider disadvantaged youth or lack of guidance as a youth as a factor for sentencing
below the guideline range.”).
210 907 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2018).
211 Id. at 124.
206
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substantially: the history and characteristics of the defendant.”212 This
included childhood sexual abuse, drug and alcohol use, and physical
abuse the court described as “horrid and nightmarish.”213
Other recent circuit cases lend further support to the use of ACEs
at sentencing. In U.S. v. Phillips,214 the Court, although it did not depart
downward, considered childhood abuse in refraining from imposing an
upward variance despite the defendant being eligible for one.215 In U.S.
v. Carpenter,216 the Court held that the district court did not commit a
procedural error in considering physical abuse at the hands of the
defendant’s stepfather as a mitigating factor.217 Finally, U.S. v.
McBride,218 provides another example of a court disobeying the
Guidelines. Although the Guidelines do not allow “diminished capacity”
as a mitigating factor, the Circuit Court held that the sentencing judge
did not err in varying downward in a child pornography case because it
was one of the worst histories of abuse and abandonment the Court had
ever seen.219
It seems clear that courts are comfortable enough to stray from the
Guidelines given the strength of ACEs research, the advisory nature of
the Guidelines, and the wide discretion they once again possess to
consider mitigating factors. The question this Comment presents is
whether judges could be and should be as comfortable with similarly
applying fetal trauma.

212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Id.
Id. at 123–24 (noting that the trauma was “unresolved and untreated”).
461 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 141.
803 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1233.
511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1298.
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IV. FETAL TRAUMA
Fetal trauma is a term for traumatic experiences, generally
experienced by the pregnant mother, that have significant effects on the
developing fetus.220 While some studies indicate a correlation between
prenatal stress and adverse emotional and behavioral outcomes in
children,221 most studies in this field have focused on either the
relationship between prenatal stress and epigenetic mechanisms or
epigenetic mechanisms and behavioral problems.222 Therefore, to
understand the possible implications of fetal trauma on future behavior,
it is first important to have a firm, albeit basic, grasp of epigenetics.
A. Epigenetics
In 1942, the developmental biologist and geneticist C. H.
Waddington introduced the word “epigenetics” and used it to describe
the influence of the environment on the human genome.223 Epigenetics
plays an important role in the interaction of nature and nurture in
determining human traits.224 This interaction involves something called
the epigenome—all of the chemical compounds that attach to one’s
genetic code that regulate the expression or activity of all the individual
genes.225 Put simply, our genetic code is like hardware (e.g., the central
processing unit (CPU) inside our laptops), and epigenetic information is
like the software operating the hardware (e.g., the downloaded
Microsoft Office products).226 These epigenetic chemical compounds—
the epigenome—turn genes on or off and control the production of
certain proteins227 without changing the underlying DNA sequence.228
220 See, e.g., Helena Palma-Gudiel et al., Maternal Psychosocial Stress During
Pregnancy Alters the Epigenetic Signature of the Glucocorticoid Receptor Gene Promoter
in Their Offspring: A Meta-Analysis, 10 EPIGENETICS 893, 893 (2015) (malnutrition,
substance abuse, and psychosocial stressors are some examples of fetal trauma).
221 See, e.g., Elisabeth Conradt et al., Incorporating Epigenetic Mechanisms to Advance
Fetal Programming Theories, 30 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 807, 807 (2018); A. B. Janssen
et al., A Role for the Placenta in Programming Maternal Mood and Childhood Behavioural
Disorders, 28 J. NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1, 1 (2016).
222 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 809.
223 Parisa Norouzitallab et al., Can Epigenetics Translate Environmental Cues into
Phenotypes?, 647 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T. 1281, 1282 (2019).
224 Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical Implications of
Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX CLEVELAND 1, 1 (2009).
225 What is Epigenetics?, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (last updated Oct. 29,
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/howgeneswork/epigenome.
226 Rothstein et al, supra note 224, at 1–2.
227 Epigenomics Fact Sheet, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (last updated
Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/factsheets/Epigenomics-Fact-Sheet.
228 Id.
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Returning to our example, Microsoft Word gives your CPU instructions
to allow you to write a paper, but it does not alter the physical structure
of your CPU. The various cells in our body use these proteins to
interpret genetic instructions and fulfill their purpose.229 For example,
on a molecular level, skin cells, brain cells, and muscle cells contain the
same DNA but have different jobs because of how they receive their
genetic instructions through epigenetic expression.230 It follows that
our brain development can be heavily influenced by environmental
experiences that change our epigenome.231 For example, smoking, diet,
and other lifestyle factors may induce epigenetic changes.232 These
epigenetic changes may affect how we respond to adversity, increase
our chances of developing mental illnesses, such as anxiety and
depression, or even increase the likelihood of physical ailments, such as
heart disease or diabetes.233
Epigenetic changes can be durable and are even inheritable.234 For
example, evidence suggests that epigenetic changes can affect
subsequent generations.235 That said, epigenetic changes are also
sensitive to the developmental stage and are “subject to
reconfiguration.”236 In fact, developing fetuses and newborns are the
most susceptible and sensitive to epigenetic changes.237 For example,
high levels of prenatal stress contribute to excess cortisol exposure,
which has an impact on gestational health outcomes.238 This basic
understanding of epigenetics will hopefully make it easier to
understand the specific findings on the impact fetal trauma has on our
epigenetic expression.

229

Id.
Rachael Rettner, Epigenetics: Definition & Examples, LIVE SCIENCE (June 24, 2013)
https://www.livescience.com/37703-epigenetics.html.
231 NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD, EARLY EXPRESSIONS CAN ALTER
GENE EXPRESSION AND AFFECT LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT: WORKING PAPER NO. 10 2 (Harvard
University 2010) [hereinafter EARLY EXPRESSIONS].
232 Fact Sheet, supra note 227.
233 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 3–4.
234 Rothstein et al., supra note 224, at 3.
235 Rothstein et al., supra note 224, at 5.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 811.
230
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B. Fetal Trauma’s Impact on Our Development
The hypothalamus, pituitary, and adrenal glands make up what is
known as the HPA axis.239 This axis controls hormonal signaling
pathways, including those responsible for our stress response.240
Serotonin is a chemical that is crucial to brain development, mood
regulation, ability to react to stress, and the development of psychiatric
disorders.241 It is “also intimately involved in the formation of the fetal
HPA axis.”242 Much of the research done in the area of epigenetic
changes and behavior has centered on the development of the HPA axis
since it is highly linked to behavioral outcomes.243
Studies have shown a link between prenatal maternal stress and an
increase of behavioral disorders in children due to an impairment of the
serotonin systems.244 Chronic activation of this system—often “likened
to revving a car engine for long periods of time”245—is linked to an
increased vulnerability to developing psychopathology.246
This
consistent level of exposure to stress impacts brain development on a
molecular and structural level and “appears to impair cognition and
increase anxiety and reactivity to stress.”247
Another way epigenetic changes in the fetus may affect our
behavioral development is through changes to the expression of the
monoglyceride lipase gene (MGLL), which regulates reward, addiction,
and pain.248 Research in this area demonstrates a correlation249
between changes to the expression of MGLL, caused by prenatal stress,
smoking, diet, or substance abuse, and children who develop “conduct
239 Alison G. Paquette & Carmen J. Marsit, The Developmental Basis of Epigenetic
Regulation of HTR2A and Psychiatric Outcomes, 113 J. CELLULAR BIOCHEMISTRY 2065, 2066
(2014).
240 Id.
241 Susanne Brummelte et al., Developmental Changes in Serotonin Signaling:
Implications for Early Brain Function, Behavior and Adaptation, 342 NEUROSCIENCE 212,
212 (2017).
242 Paquette & Marsit, supra note 239, at 2066.
243 Nicole M. Talge et al., Antenatal Maternal Stress and Long-Term Effects on Child
Neurodevelopment: How and Why?, 48 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 245, 253 (2007).
244 Joey St-Pierre et al., Effects of Prenatal Maternal Stress on Serotonin and Fetal
Development, 30 PLACENTA S66, S69 (2016).
245 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 3.
246 Talge et al., supra note 243, at 254.
247 Alexandra Miranda & Nuno Sousa, Maternal Hormonal Milieu Influence on Fetal
Brain Development, 8 BRAIN BEHAV. 1, 1 (2017).
248 Epigenetic Changes at Birth Could Explain Later Behavior Problems, SCIENCE DAILY
(June 12, 2017), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/06/1706120
94030.htm.
249 “Although these findings do not prove causation, they do highlight the neonatal
period as a potentially important window of biological vulnerability . . . .” Id.
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problems” such as fighting, lying, and stealing—behavior that places
children at a higher risk for severe antisocial behavior.250
These studies, however, focus on epigenetic changes resulting from
fetal trauma and tie those changes to what we know about the
relationship between certain chemicals and human behavior. There are
few, if any, fetal trauma studies like the longitudinal observational
studies on ACEs and criminal behavior. More of these studies would be
needed before courts are confident enough to consider this as a factor.
That said, even if further studies bolster the connection between fetal
trauma and criminal behavior, it should still not be considered at
sentencing.
V. SHOULD FETAL TRAUMA PLAY A ROLE IN SENTENCING DECISIONS?
Many fetal complications can have an impact on behavior.251 The
sheer number of things that can happen to a pregnant mother resulting
in epigenetic changes to her fetus should alone be reason enough to put
fetal trauma to the side at sentencing. Additionally, the research on fetal
trauma, while peer-reviewed and tested, does not yet create a strong
enough correlation between fetal trauma and criminal behavior and
thus lacks the general acceptance by the scientific community afforded
to ACEs.252 The Sentencing Commission has expressed its disapproval
for factors that are too amorphous with no restrictions as to how and
when they could be applied.253 On the other hand, if ever someone’s
culpability should be reduced by past trauma, it seems wise to consider
trauma they experience at a time when they are most vulnerable and
out of control. Indeed the research, although not as reliable as ACEs
with regard to criminal behavior, is far from inadequate and does
demonstrate certain epigenetic changes that can be devastating, lasting,
and sometimes permanent.254 That said, there are many more
compelling reasons why fetal trauma should not be considered at
sentencing.
These compelling reasons, listed below, can be applied in equal
force to argue against the consideration of ACEs at sentencing; this
Comment will apply each in turn. But whether ACEs should be
250

Id.
Jones, supra note 118, at 130.
252 See supra Section IV.B.
253 William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline
Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63,
84 (1993) (referring to “lack of youthful guidance”). This, however, may not be a
valuable argument given judges’ willingness to, when the situation calls for it, disobey
the Guidelines as to considering “lack of youthful guidance.” See supra Section III.D.3.
254 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 1, 3.
251
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considered at sentencing is beyond the scope of this Comment. That
said, it is worthwhile to address this argument briefly. At first glance, it
makes sense that the arguments laid out in this Comment against
considering fetal trauma at sentencing should apply with equal force to
ACEs. That said, the two are distinguishable enough to argue for the
allowance of ACEs while simultaneously drawing the line there. ACEs
can help a defendant argue for mitigation when there is no
record—hospital, school, or diagnosis—of the trauma suffered during
childhood or its lasting impact. This is because ACEs are relatively easy
to present to a court as the defendant consciously lived those
experiences as opposed to fetal trauma, which occurs in utero. They are
also more strongly tied to criminal behavior than fetal trauma and occur
closer to adulthood, thus decreasing the time in which any lasting
negative impact can be repaired. But these arguments cast ACEs
through the lens by which we view fetal trauma—that of “mental
illness,” whereby trauma causes cognitive changes affecting behavior on
a cellular level, thus decreasing one’s culpability. This implicates
retribution and deterrence. There is a stronger argument when taking
ACEs into account for rehabilitation purposes, such as redirecting a
defendant to a special program as opposed to a traditional prison.
For example, restorative justice programs aim to rehabilitate
defendants regardless of any present mental or physical deficiency that
causes decreased culpability.255 The underlying philosophy has more to
do with undoing an ingrained way of life.256 As such, it stands to reason
that someone who experienced a series of ACEs—abuse, exposure to
crime, exposure to drug and alcohol abuse—even without experiencing
a long-term neurological effect, would benefit from an environment that
seeks to counter those established norms in their life. To illustrate, let
us look at two hypothetical defendants: Arthur and Bob. Arthur and Bob
grow up in the same household. Unfortunately, their childhood was
filled with exposure to abuse, drugs, and criminal behavior. Bob is
genetically predisposed in such a way that the ACEs have significant and
severe lasting impacts to the effect that he has developed antisocial
behaviors as a result of deficient neurological development. Arthur is
genetically predisposed in such a way that these ACEs do not have a
255

See generally What is Restorative Justice, INSIGHT PRISON PROJECT (last visited Jan. 9,
2020), http://www.insightprisonproject.org/a-restorative-justice-agency.html; U.S.
PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVS., U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASS., RISE PROGRAM
PACKET (2017), https://www.map.uscourts.gov/sites/map/files/RISE%20Program%
20Statement%202.0%202017.pdf.
256 See Paul McCold, Restorative Justice: The Role of the Community, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES (Mar. 31, 1995), https://www.iirp.edu/news/
restorative-justice-the-role-of-the-community.
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lasting impact on his neurological development. That said, Arthur is
surrounded by negative stimuli and, even without physical changes to
his brain or his neurotransmission, he sees this world as “normal.” Both
men are found guilty of robbery. Bob would argue that his ACEs
diminished his culpability as they caused him to have a condition that
presently affects his impulse control and understanding of social norms.
Arthur has no present condition that diminished his culpability, but he
would argue that, having never known a “normal” life, he would greatly
benefit from a program that could help correct those misguided norms.
Arthur is the reason judges may want to continue considering ACEs
at sentencing. This Comment accepts that ACEs sometimes have a role
to play in the sentencing process. That said, the following arguments do
apply with equal force to the culpability aspect of ACEs and are
compelling arguments that judges should not continue to use ACEs as a
reason to simply lower a defendant’s sentence due to diminished
culpability; rather, judges should reserve the consideration of ACEs for
diversion to rehabilitative programs.
A. “Repairing” Epigenetic Changes
Assume judges developed enough confidence in criminogenic fetal
trauma research and could comfortably distinguish between the
degrees of fetal trauma—from socioeconomic factors to substance
abuse—that they should and should not consider at sentencing. There
is still the issue that many of these changes are epigenetic and thus can
theoretically be reversed during a defendant’s lifetime.257 Not only do
different people respond differently to traumatic experiences, but life
experiences between birth and adulthood can affect the ultimate impact
trauma has on someone.258 For example, how one responds to stress
might be altered by environmental inputs during sensitive
developmental periods.259 In fact, children that may have been more
biologically susceptible to epigenetic changes in the first place may be
the best candidates for reprogramming during these periods.260
Research is ongoing into the various types of treatment that might
reverse epigenetic alterations: this includes both pharmacological

257 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 4; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 227 (“The
epigenome can also change throughout a person’s lifetime.”).
258 SAMHSA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., TRAUMA-INFORMED CARE IN BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH SERVICES 59 (2014).
259 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 811.
260 Id.
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treatment261 and environmental therapy.262
Even non-targeted
interventions, such as neighborhoods and social groups, seem to
promote better health outcomes through epigenetic changes during
childhood.263 Research even suggests that epigenetic alterations that
occur because of early stressors may be “normalized or even prevented
by pharmacological intervention during early life, adolescence as well
as adulthood.”264 The English study, which was cited to support the use
of ACEs in sentencing,265 seems to hint at this. Youth victims of abuse
were 11 times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime as a juvenile,
but only 2.7 times more likely to be arrested for the same as an adult.266
Although it is unclear why, this shows a significant “improvement” in
the likelihood of arrest for violent crimes between adolescence and
adulthood.
But much of this is true for ACEs as well: “The presence of ACEs
does not mean that a child will experience poor outcomes. But
children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent
children from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of
the negative health and life outcomes even after adversity has
occurred.”267 Assuming this research on “repairing” epigenetic
alterations applies equally to fetal trauma and ACEs, it stands to reason
that judges should either consider fetal trauma or stop considering
ACEs. That said, even though there is more time for change between
fetus and adulthood than childhood and adulthood, there are still other
reasons beyond epigenetic repair for not considering fetal trauma at
sentencing.
B. Observable or Diagnosable Issues in Adult Defendants
It bears mentioning that the scientific community does not conduct
research with the goal of criminal culpability in mind. The scientific
261 See, e.g., St-Pierre et al., supra note 244, at S69 (treating anomalies in mice with
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs)); Nadine Provencal & Elisabeth B.
Binder, The Neurobiological Effects of Stress as Contributors to Psychiatric Disorders:
Focus On Epigenetics, 30 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 31, 34 (2015).
262 Sara Palumbo et al., Genes and Aggressive Behavior: Epigenetic Mechanisms
Underlying Individual Susceptibility to Aversive Environments, 12 FRONTIERS BEHAV.
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 5 (2018).
263 Colter Mitchell, et al., DNA Methylation, Early Life Environment, and Health
Outcomes, 79 PEDIATRIC RES. 212, 215 (2016).
264 Annamaria Cattaneo et al., Inflammation and Neuronal Plasticity: A Link Between
Childhood Trauma and Depression Pathogenesis, 9 FRONTIERS CELLULAR NEUROSCIENCE 1, 6
(2015).
265 See supra Section III.D.1.
266 English et al., supra note 186, at 33–34.
267 About ACEs, supra note 179.
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community seeks to work backward from observable or diagnosable
issues, learn why they occur, and figure out how to prevent them
through policy or intervention.268 Although beyond the scope of this
Comment, this type of “causation” research would be much more salient
and useful in civil “litigations regarding multi-generational
environmentally-driven health effects.”269 While all the research on
fetal trauma provides a cause for issues developed and retained
throughout one’s life, those issues are often diagnosable270 or
measurable through some form of testing or imaging of the adult
defendant.271 For example, when serotonin is studied in epigenetic fetal
trauma research, it often concerns an increased “risk of psychiatric
diseases such as depression, anxiety, or autism later in life.”272 Even the
Court in Atkins evaluated the admissibility of the defendant’s diagnosis
as “mentally retarded.”273 Absent a showing at sentencing of mental
illness or some undiagnosable but observable chemical imbalance, fetal
trauma may not have had a lasting impact on a given defendant.
The counter to this, of course, is the same as it was for repairing
epigenetic alterations; this argument applies to ACEs as well. Any
experience of ACEs that had a lasting impact strong enough to mitigate
a criminal sentence should have resulted in an observable or
diagnosable issue at sentencing. This is yet another reason judges
should not consider even ACEs when determining diminished
culpability with regards to a decreased sentence for a defendant.
C. Cost
It is easier to present evidence of ACEs than fetal trauma without
requiring the hiring of an expert to show that those experiences had
lasting mental or genetic effects on the defendant. ACEs are often
268

See EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 1–2.
Tania L. Roth, Epigenetic Mechanisms in the Development of Behavior: Advances,
Challenges, and Future Promises of a New Field, 25 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1279, 1288
(2013).
270 See, e.g., Paquette & Marsit, supra note 239, at 2071 (“Epigenetic regulation has
arisen as a potential way to explain psychiatric disorders . . . .”); Talge et al., supra note
243, at 245 (prenatal stress can lead to ADHD, anxiety, and language delay).
271 See, e.g., Nelkin, supra note 156, at 2121 (“[C]ourts in the 1980s frequently
allowed brain images from Positron Emission Tomography (‘PET’) scans to enter into
sentencing decisions.”); Baum, supra note 153, at 287 (genetic variant was tested and
shown to exist at the time of sentencing).
272 St-Pierre et al., supra note 244, at 70 (emphasis added); see also Talge et al., supra
note 243, at 251 (longitudinal study of women who were pregnant during a devastating
flood or the German invasion of the Netherlands had children with a higher risk of
developing schizophrenia).
273 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308–09 (2002) (forensic psychologist testified
at sentencing about defendant’s mild mental retardation and low IQ).
269

MULLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/12/2021 1:42 PM

COMMENT

1421

collected by the probation officer in creating the presentence report.274
Because a judge must accept the undisputed parts of the report as
findings of fact and it is generally scientifically accepted that ACEs have
a significant impact on adult criminal behavior, it is relatively easy to
present ACEs for consideration at sentencing.
Conversely,
neuroimaging, genetic evidence, and expert testimony can cost upwards
of $50,000.275 When neither a defendant nor the government can afford
to foot such a bill to definitively show the current neurological or genetic
state of a defendant, ACEs are a useful alternative. This argument
theoretically applies to fetal trauma, but it is much more difficult to
collect reliable information about instances of fetal trauma than ACEs.
Interviews conducted by the probation officer and records obtained
from schools, doctors, and hospitals lend themselves to the discovery of
a defendant’s experience with ACEs. A defendant cannot even speak to
their own experience of fetal trauma. Furthermore, because the
research has not yet demonstrated a strong enough connection between
fetal trauma and criminal behavior, it would not be as reliable to use
fetal trauma without present evaluation.
Lastly, critics may argue that fetal trauma should be taken into
account for a defendant who: (1) only experienced such extreme fetal
trauma that it altered him substantially and permanently; (2) never
suffered ACEs during his upbringing; and (3) the lasting effects are not
observable, non-diagnosable, or would be too expensive for a defendant
to present at sentencing. Even this improbable scenario fails, however,
because judges should avoid getting sucked into a black hole of genetic
heritability.
D. Genetic Heritability
Epigenetics is an ever-expanding field of study. While this
Comment focused on epigenetic alterations that can occur in one’s
lifetime, there is a growing body of research studying epigenetic
alterations that occur in parents before they even conceive and how
they could get passed down to their children and beyond.276 This
intergenerational transmission may allow a parent’s ACEs to one day
impact their child’s fetal development.277 Judges would get tangled up
in a defendant’s heritage of suffering. Where would judges draw the
274

USSG, supra note 2, § 6A1.1(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(B).
Walker, supra note 123, at 1804–05.
276 Kate Keenan et al., Extending the Developmental Origins of Disease Model: Impact
of Preconception Stress Exposure on Offspring Neurodevelopment, 60 DEV. PSYCHOBIOLOGY
753, 753 (2018).
277 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 808.
275
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line? Would they consider a parent’s experiences during the Jim Crow
era, a grandparent’s experiences during the Holocaust, a greatgrandparent’s experiences during World War I?
Venturing down this path would also implicate questions of free
will and determinism. If we can trace the cause of our actions to
suffering that occurred before we were even a thought, what does that
do to our understanding of culpability? In the grand scheme of life,
stressors and environmental factors can only change so much—there is
a codependent factor, which is a person’s innate personal
characteristics that can moderate or exacerbate the effect of
environmental insults.278 At the same time, it is important for the
maturation of our society that we recognize that not all defendants are
the same. A balance needs to be struck, and considering fetal trauma at
sentencing goes far afield and upsets that balance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Case law, standards, public morals and values, and even the
Guidelines all suggest that a sentencing judge could consider evidence
of a defendant’s traumatic experience during gestation. But judges
should not. There are not enough longitudinal, observational studies on
people who experienced fetal trauma and their disposition to violent or
criminal behavior. Yet even in a world brimming with such research,
there is so much opportunity for trauma to a fetus—from substance
abuse to socioeconomic stressors to physical trauma—that a judge
would be hard-pressed to draw the line between what degree of fetal
trauma should be considered and what should not. Furthermore,
research indicates that since these changes are epigenetic, positive
experiences during childhood might repair any prenatal changes from
trauma—and those that are irreparable manifest as observable or
diagnosable issues in adults and are discernible at sentencing. Courts
should avoid the world of genetic heritability, stop at considering ACEs,
and look no further into a defendant’s past.
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